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STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
KEITH MYLES SLATER, 
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Case No. 20050012-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from an order revoking his probation after he pled guilty 
to aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
302 (2003); theft, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 
(2003); unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2003); and attempted escape 
from official custody, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
309(a),(b) (2003), in the Third Judicial District Court of Utah, Salt Lake County, the 
Honorable Leslie A. Lewis presiding. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Does a trial court have jurisdiction, after it enters a final judgment, to 
reduce the degree of the conviction and to resentence the defendant under Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1) (West 2004)? 
Standard of Review. The trial court's authority to reduce a conviction is 
statutory. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402. This issue thus involves a question of 
statutory interpretation that this Court reviews for correctness. See State v. Gurr, 904 
P.2d 238, 243 (Utah App. 1995). 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for 
a section 402 reduction, where he violated the terms of his probation by fleeing 
his drug treatment program after only two days and by committing three more 
drug offenses? 
Standard of Review. A trial court's ruling on a motion to reduce the degree of a 
conviction is a sentencing issue that this court reviews for abuse of discretion. See 
State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, \ 31, 25 P.3d 985. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
This appeals concerns the application of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (West 
2004), attached as Addendum A. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant pled guilty to one count of aggravated robbery, one count of theft, 
one count of drug possession, and one count of attempted escape (R. 22,29-31). In 
exchange for defendant's guilty plea, the prosecutor agreed to dismiss the charges in 
another case and not to file any further vehicle theft-related charges for defendant's 
conduct on November 15,2002 (R. 25). The court set sentencing for April 25,2003 
(R. 23). 
Two days before sentencing, defendant filed a motion under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-402 (West 2004) to reduce his aggravated robbery conviction to vehicle theft, a 
second degree felony, and assault, a class B misdemeanor (R. 34-35). He asserted 
that the elements of aggravated robbery were not met because he did not "use force 
against the vehicle owner in an attempt to steal the vehicle" (R. 34) Rather, 
defendant claimed, he used force to defend himself when "the vehicle's owner 
entered the vehicle and grabbed [defendant]" (R. 34). Defendant added that even if 
the elements did exist, a five-to-life prison term would be unduly harsh (R. 34-35). 
The court continued sentencing to allow time to consider defendant's motion (R. 43). 
The prosecutor responded that defendant's 402 motion was improper because 
he had pled guilty (R. 51-52). He explained that the motion "undercuts the system 
of plea-bargaining" and "deprives the State of the ability to introduce its evidence to 
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demonstrate . . . that the punishment is appropriate" (R. 52). The State offered 
instead to stipulate to a motion to withdraw the plea (R. 52). 
The Court denied the motion to reduce the conviction (R. 45). On August 15, 
2003, it sentenced defendant to the statutory prison and jail terms for each offense 
(R. 55). It then suspended each term and placed defendant on probation for thirty-
six months (R. 55-58). The probation terms included serving a year in the county 
jail and completing the Odyssey House in-patient drug program (R. 57-58). 
Defendant did not appeal. 
On December 4,2003, the court ordered defendant's release from jail to allow 
him to commence treatment at the Odyssey House (R. 65). Less than two months 
later, Adult Probation and Parole ("AP&P") filed a violation report alleging that 
defendant had failed to comply with several conditions of his probation (75-76). On 
December 3, 2004, the court held a hearing on an order to show cause at which 
defendant admitted to violating his probation by possessing and arranging the 
distribution of drugs and by possessing a dangerous weapon (R. 95; 120:3-^ 1). 
Defendant again moved for a 402 reduction of his aggravated robbery conviction to 
a second degree felony (R. 93; 120:7). The court denied the motion, revoked 
defendant's probation, and committed him to prison (R. 93-95; 120:97). Defendant 
timely appealed his probation revocation to the Utah Supreme Court (R. 102-03). 
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That court transferred the case to this Court pursuant to the pour-over provisions of 
Utah Code Ann § 78-2-2(4) (West 2004) (R. 115-16). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS* 
Defendant was a daily methamphetamine user and owed several drug debts 
(R. PSL2, 4). He decided that stealing cars would be an "eas[y] way to repay his 
debts" (R. PSL2). Defendant intended to steal as many cars as he needed by stealing 
one, driving it around until he found another, parking the first, and then stealing the 
next (R. PSL4). His creditors would then help him backtrack and retrieve all the 
stolen vehicles (R. PSL4). 
Defendant stole Edgar Gonzales7 car from his driveway while it was warming 
up unattended (R. PSL3). Edgar reported the theft to police and also mentioned that 
a Dodge Spirit had been left near his home with the door open and the keys lying 
nearby (R. PSL3). Police confirmed that the Dodge Spirit had also been reported 
stolen (R. PSL3). 
Defendant parked Edgar's car near the home of Jared McPherson where 
defendant tried to steal Jared's car, which was also warming up unattended (R. 
1
 The facts are taken from defendant's presentence investigation report (PSI). 
Defendant did not challenge the accuracy of any part of the PSI (R. 119:2). "If a 
party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at the 
time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived/' Utah Code Ann. § 
77-18-1 (6)(b) (West 2004). 
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PSL3). As defendant was backing out of Jared's driveway, however, Jared saw him 
and ran to the driver's side door of the car (R. PSL3). He opened the door and 
grabbed defendant, who fought with Jared and struck him several times before 
fleeing on foot (R. PSL3). 
Police apprehended defendant a short distance away (R. PSL3). He had 
several items on his person including a palm pilot, a cell phone, glasses, wallets, a 
watch, cash, a knife, and some methamphetamine (R. PSL4). Police arrested 
defendant and transported him to the sheriffs office in Taylorsville (R. PSL4). 
While left alone in an interview room, defendant tried to escape by removing the 
ceiling tiles and scrambling into the crawlspace (R. PSL4). Police ordered him to 
stop, but he continued crawling until the ceiling collapsed, dropping him to the 
floor (R. PSI:4). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant appeals a single issue: whether the court abused its discretion in 
denying his motion to reduce his aggravated robbery conviction to a second degree 
felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1). He did not, however, appeal his 
conviction and sentence. Nor did he appeal the trial court's initial denial of his 
motion. Rather, defendant appeals only from the court's order revoking his 
probation over a year after the court entered the final judgment. This Court only 
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has jurisdiction, therefore, to consider issues related to the court's revocation of his 
probation. 
Defendant moved for a section 402 reduction at his probation revocation 
hearing. However, a court may only reduce an offender's conviction under section 
402(1) before or at the time it enters the final judgment. The trial court had no 
jurisdiction to entertain defendant's motion; thus this Court has no jurisdiction to 
review the trial court's denial of the motion. 
Even if this Court did have jurisdiction to review defendant's claim, the claim 
is meritless. The presentence report and diagnostic evaluation state that defendant 
is a drug addict and a recidivist who is escalating his criminal behavior and 
becoming more violent and more dangerous to society. The court did not, therefore, 
abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to reduce his conviction. 
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ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW DEFENDANT'S 
CLAIM BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT TIMELY APPEAL HIS 
CONVICTION 
Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his 
motion for a section 402 reduction in his sentence. Br. App. at 12-16. Specifically, 
he asserts that the trial court failed to "consider the circumstances of the offense and 
[defendant's] character and history before denying his motion." Br. App. at 15. 
This Court lacks jurisdiction to review defendant's claim because the claim 
concerns defendant's conviction and sentence, which he did not appeal. 
A. Defendant's appeal is limited to review of the trial court's 
revocation of his probation. 
Generally, a defendant who desires to appeal his conviction and sentence 
must file a notice of appeal within thirty days of entry of the final judgment. See 
Utah R. App. P. 3(a), 4(a). The sentencing order is usually the final order that 
disposes of the case and starts the thirty-day window for appealing a conviction and 
sentence. See State v. Bowers, 2002 UT100, J 4,57 P.3d 1065; State v. Walker, 2002 UT 
App 290,111, 55 P.3d 1165. Failure to file a timely notice of appeal deprives the 
appellate court of jurisdiction over the case. See Bowers, 2002 UT 100, % 5 (noting 
that thirty-day period for filing notice of appeal is jurisdictional and cannot be 
enlarged by court); State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 37 (Utah 1981) (same). 
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Post-judgment orders by the trial court do not resurrect a defendant's right to 
appeal his underlying conviction and sentence, unless the order concerns a timely 
motion under rule 4(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. For example, the Utah 
Supreme Court held in State v. Garner, 2005 UT 6, J 17, 106 P.3d 729, that a 
restitution order entered several months after the final judgment was "not a new 
and final judgment for purposes of appealing the underlying merits of a criminal 
conviction." Likewise, this Court has held that a revocation of a defendant's 
probation does not renew the time to appeal the original judgment. See State v. Love, 
2001 UT App 79,13 (unpublished memorandum decision), attached as Addendum 
B. 
Rather, appeals from non-rule 4(b) judgments are limited to review of that 
particular judgment. Appeals from post-judgment orders are permitted by statute if 
they concern an "order made after judgment that affects the substantial rights of the 
defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(l)(b) (West 2004). The right to appeal a 
post-judgment order is distinct and separate, however, from a defendant's right to 
appeal a "final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea." Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18a-l(l)(a) (West 2004). For example, an appeal from a post-judgment 
restitution order is limited to review only of the propriety of the restitution order. 
See Garner, 2005 UT 6,117. Similarly, an appeal from a probation revocation order, 
as in the instant case, is limited to examining the propriety of the probation 
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revocation, not the underlying conviction or sentence. Defendant may not use the 
revocation order to reach back in time and resurrect issues relating to his conviction 
and sentence. See Love, 2001 UT App 79, \ 3 
Inasmuch as defendant appeals from a post-judgment order revoking his 
probation, this Court only has jurisdiction to consider the denial of his section 402 
motion if the trial court had jurisdiction at the probation revocation hearing to 
entertain a section 402 motion. Cf. State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676, 681 (Utah App. 
1991) (holding that since trial court lacked jurisdiction to resentence Montoya, 
appellate court had no jurisdiction to review resentencing). 
B. A trial court has no jurisdiction to reduce the degree of an 
offense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1) once it enters a 
valid final judgment. 
Under the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1), a court may only 
reduce the degree of the offense before it sentences the offender and enters a final 
judgment. The statute does not authorize the court to amend an offender's 
conviction and sentence after entry of the final judgment 
A court's authority to reduce the degree of an offense is statutory, and the 
scope and limits of that authority are thus a matter of statutory interpretation. 
"When interpreting statutes, we determine the statute's meaning by first looking to 
the statute's plain language, and give effect to the plain language unless the 
language is ambiguous/' Blackner v. Dep't of Tramp., 2002 UT 44,112,48 P.3d 949. 
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The Court's primary goal "is to give effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by 
the plain language, in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve." State 
v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, \ 25,4 P.3d 795. The Court reads the statutory language so as 
"'to render all parts [of the statute] relevant and meaningful.'" State v. Maestas, 2002 
UT 123, \ 52, 63 P.3d 621 (quoting Utah v. Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, \ 10, 44 P.3d 
680) (emphasis and brackets in Maestas). Accordingly, "'effect must be given, if 
possible, to every word, clause, and sentence of a statute No clause [,] sentence 
or word shall be construed as superfluous, void or insignificant if the construction 
can be found which will give force to and preserve all the words of the statute.'" Id. 
at \ 53 (quoting Norman J. Singer, 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction §46:06 (4th 
ed. 1984)). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1) states the following: 
If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the 
offense of which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and 
character of the defendant, concludes it would be unduly harsh to 
record the conviction as being for that degree of offense established by 
statute and to sentence the defendant to an alternative normally 
applicable to that offense, the court may unless otherwise specifically 
provided by law enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower 
degree of offense and impose sentence accordingly.2 
2
 Subsection (2) of the statute provides alternative conditions for reducing a 
third degree felony to a class A misdemeanor. As defendant challenges his 
conviction for aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, subsection (2) does not 
apply. 
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Subsection (1) authorizes a court to reduce the classification of an offense by 
one degree if the court concludes that the statutory degree is too harsh in light of the 
offender's history and the circumstances of the crime. The last phrase in subsection 
(1) states that the court may reduce the level of the offense and then "impose 
sentence accordingly." Utah Code Ann. §76-3-402(1). The direction to "impose 
sentence accordingly" suggests an intent by the legislature that courts only use 
subsection (1) to reduce a conviction before sentencing. That construction is 
consistent with this Court's and the Utah Supreme Court's prior holdings regarding 
the jurisdiction of a trial court after sentencing. 
"Once a court imposes a valid sentence, it loses subject matter jurisdiction 
over the case." State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676,679 (Utah App. 1991); see also State v. 
Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, \ 10,84 P.3d 854. It may not thereafter revisit the case to 
set aside or amend the sentence unless the sentence is illegal. See Utah R. Crim. P. 
22(e) ("The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal 
manner, at any time."); State v. Tinlayson, 2004 UT 10, \ 16,84 P.3d 1193 (concluding 
that trial court had no jurisdiction to resentence Finlayson after remittitur of appeal 
in which one of three convictions was reversed); State v. McGuire, 2005 UT App 13, \ 
5 (unpublished memorandum decision) (explaining that once a court imposes a 
valid sentence, the court has no subject matter jurisdiction to resentence the 
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defendant, and the appellate court has no authority to review any purported 
resentencing), attached as Addendum C. 
Construing subsection (1) to allow a court to reduce the classification of an 
offense after sentencing would open the door for offenders to seek reclassification 
and resentencing months or even years after the final judgment. Such an 
interpretation is inimical to the interests of finality in judicial proceedings, as well as 
against the plain language of the statute. It would put the final judgment in limbo 
leaving it forever open to possible reclassification and a new appeal based on the 
denial of the reclassification. As shown by the plain language of the statue, the 
legislature did not intend such a result. 
Permitting courts to reduce the degree of a conviction only before entry of the 
final order is also consistent with rule 12, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. That 
rule states that motions to reduce a criminal offense must be filed at least ten days 
before sentencing. See Utah R. Crim. P. 12(c)(2).4 
3
 Courts may, however, revoke, modify, or extend probation within the 
guidelines set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (West 2004). Where a prison 
sentence has already been imposed but is suspended, revocation of probation is not 
resentencing, but rather, execution of an already imposed sentence. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18-l(12)(e)(iii) ("If the probation is revoked, the defendant shall be 
sentenced or the sentence previously imposed shall be executed"). 
4
 The rule was amended on April 1,2005, to permit parties to file a motion to 
reduce a third degree felony under section 402(2) anytime after sentencing. 
13 
Such a construction of subsection (1) is not only consistent with its plain 
language and the rules and precedent of this Court, it is also good policy. A 
reduction under subsection (1) requires the court to consider "the nature and 
circumstances of the offense of which the defendant was found guilty/7 Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-402(1). These are matters that the trial court must already consider in 
imposing sentence. See State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, % 8,40 P.3d 626 (requiring trial 
courts to consider all legally relevant factors in sentencing). They are also matters 
that may be difficult to consider at a probation revocation hearing held months or 
even years after the final judgment. This is particularly true in cases where the 
defendant pleads guilty and there is little or no record of the details of the offense. 
The State may lose track of victims and witnesses and may return or destroy 
exhibits, all of which could be necessary to consider "the nature and circumstances 
of the offense." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1). 
C. Because defendant raises no claim related to the revocation 
of his probation, this Court lacks jurisdiction over his 
appeal. 
Defendant's only claim before this Court is that the trial court erred in 
denying his motion to reduce the degree of his offense. Br. Aplt. at 13-16. He 
appeals, however, from the court's order revoking his probation, which occurred 
more than a year after the final judgment (R. 102). He does not challenge the basis 
for the revocation. Although defendant moved for a section 402 reduction at the 
14 
probation revocation hearing, the trial court had no jurisdiction to entertain such a 
motion. See supra subpoint B. Inasmuch as the trial court lacked jurisdiction to 
consider the motion, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the denial of the motion 
and should dismiss the case. Cf. Montoya, 825 P.2d at 681 (holding that since trial 
court's lacked jurisdiction to resentence Montoya, appellate court had no 
jurisdiction to review resentencing).5 
D. Even if this Court had jurisdiction, defendant's claim is 
meritless. 
Even if this Court had jurisdiction to review defendant's claim, the claim is 
meritless. The Utah Supreme Court has treated motions to reduce the degree of an 
offense as a sentencing issue for which trial courts have wide discretion. See State v. 
Boyd, 2001 UT 30, \ 31, 25 P.3d 985. This Court must afford the trial court "wide 
latitude and discretion in sentencing." State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d 665, 671 (Utah 
1997). "[A] sentence imposed by the trial court should be overturned only when it 
is inherently unfair or clearly excessive." Id. 
Defendant candidly acknowledges that "[t]here was evidence to support the 
trial court's sentence." Br. Aplt. at 14. He refers to the PSI, which categorized him 
5
 The question of jurisdiction was not raised in the trial court. This Court 
may, however, affirm a lower court on any ground apparent in the record. See State 
v. Chevre, 2000 UT App 6, % 12, 994 P.2d 1278. Moreover, the issue of jurisdiction 
may be raised at anytime. See Montoya, 825 P.2d at 679. 
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"in the high category of recidivism" (R. PSL2). The PSI also noted that defendant 
has "a fairly extensive juvenile record," "had been fired from his job because of drug 
use," had escalated his pattern of criminal behavior, and had become more violent 
and "posed more danger to the community" (R. PSL2-3). Also, a diagnostic 
evaluation conducted by the Department of Corrections diagnosed defendant with 
Amphetamine and Cannabis Dependence and Antisocial Personality Disorder and 
attributed to him "a pervasive pattern of disregard for, and violation of, the rights of 
others" (R. Diagnostic Evaluation at 2). 
A reduction was also not warranted because defendant had already received 
a substantial amount of lenity. In exchange for defendant's guilty plea, the State 
agreed to dismiss charges pending in another case and to not file charges relating to 
defendant's crime spree on November 15,2005 (R. 25). The court also agreed to put 
defendant on probation and allow him to enter the Odyssey House drug treatment 
program (R. 57-58). Defendant stayed only two days at the Odyssey House, 
however, and subsequently violated his probation by committing three more drug 
offenses (R. 69; 120:3-^1, 6). Defendant's inability to maintain the conditions of his 
probation provided ample justification for the court to refuse to reduce the level of 
his conviction. 
Despite the myriad of reasons not to reduce the degree of defendant's offense, 
defendant claims the court imposed an unduly harsh sentence because defendant 
16 
"exhibited only reactive force" during the attempted robbery of Jared McPherson's 
car. Br. Aplt. at 15. He asserts that the harsh sentence imposed for first degree 
felonies should be reserved for "defendants who exhibit proactive force in 
committing robberies." Br. Aplt. at 15. 
Defendant's use of "reactive" rather than "proactive" force in stealing Jared 
McPherson's car is not a reason to reduce the level of his offense, even absent the 
mountain of evidence weighing against a reduction. When Jared moved to stop 
defendant from stealing his car, defendant assaulted him and threatened to kill him 
and his family (R. PSL7). The fact that defendant acted in response to Jared's actions 
and not spontaneously does not mitigate his crime. Such a claim is akin to arguing 
that a conviction for assaulting a police officer should be reduced because the 
offender was only responding to the officer's attempt to arrest him. The robbery 
was "aggravated" because defendant escalated the situation by assaulting the car's 
owner rather the acknowledging that he was caught and cooperating by returning 
the car. 
17 
CONCLUSION 
The State respectfully requests the Court to dismiss defendant's appeal. 
Defendant did not appeal his sentence and conviction, and the trial court did not 
have jurisdiction at the probation revocation hearing, from which defendant now 
appeals, to entertain his motion for a section 402 reduction. Therefore, this Court 
likewise lacks jurisdiction to review the denial of that motion. 
Respectfully submitted on this >Q day of August 2005. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MATTHEW D. BATES 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED 
The State requests oral argument. "[0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the 
appellate court in its decision making process/7 Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals, 
2005 UT 18,110,110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between 
the litigant and the bench." Moles v. Regents of Univ. ofCal, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557,560 
(Cal. 1982). In the case at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided 
by oral argument." Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3). Moreover, because the jurisdictional 
issue raised by the State concerns a matter of first impression, the court should issue 
its decision in a published opinion. See Grand County v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25, % 14,44 
18 
P.3d 734 ("A memorandum decision may not be used to render a decision in any 
matter not clearly and unequivocally disposed of on the basis of well-established 
Utah case law or Utah statute/7). 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this \0 day of August 2005,1 served four copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellee upon the defendant/appellant, Keith Myles Slater, 
by causing them to be delivered by hand to his counsel of record as follows: 
Lori J. Seppi 
Salt Lake Legal Defenders Assoc. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
§ 76—3—402. Conviction of lower degree of offense 
(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense 
of which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and character of the 
defendant, concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the conviction as 
being for that degree of offense established by statute and to sentence the 
defendant to an alternative normally applicable to that offense, the court may 
unless otherwise specifically provided by law enter a judgment of conviction for 
the next lower degree of offense and impose sentence accordingly. 
(2) If a conviction is for a third degree felony the conviction is considered to 
be for a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the judge designates the sentence to be for a class A misdemeanor and 
the sentence imposed is within*the limits provided by law for a class A 
misdemeanor; or 
(b)(i) the imposition of the sentence is stayed and the defendant is placed 
on probation, whether committed to jail as a condition of probation or not; 
(ii) the defendant is subsequently discharged without violating his proba-
tion; and 
(iii) the judge upon motion and notice to the prosecuting attorney, and a 
hearing if requested by either party or the court, finds it is in the interest of 
justice that the conviction be considered to be for a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) An offense may be reduced only one degree under this section unless the 
prosecutor specifically agrees in writing or on the court record that the offense 
may be reduced two degrees. In no case maty an offense be reduced under this 
section by more than two degrees. 
(4) This section may not be construed to preclude any person from obtaining 
or being granted an expungement of his record as provided by law. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-3-402; Laws 1983, c. 88, § 6; Laws 1991, c. 7, § 1. 
Addendum B 
V\fest!av£ 
Not Reported in P.3d Page 1 
2001 WL 311194 (Utah App.), 2001 UT App 79 
(Cite as: 2001 WL 311194 (Utah App.)) 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT 
RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
William LOVE, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 020000794-CA. 
March 8, 2001. 
William Love aka William Maiben, Salt Lake City, 
pro se. 
Before JACKSON, BENCH, and DAVIS, JJ. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
PER CURIAM. 
*1 This case is before the court on a sua sponte 
motion for summary dismissal. Appellant did not 
respond. 
Appellant seeks to appeal from his conviction 
following a no contest plea to the offense of Stalking, 
a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-106.5 (1999). The trial court entered its 
judgment and sentence on October 29, 1999. 
Appellant did not seek to withdraw his no contest 
plea and did not file a timely appeal from the 
judgment or sentence. Following a hearing held on 
August 16, 2000, the trial court revoked appellant's 
probation, imposed a ten day jail sentence, and 
reinstated probation for twelve months beginning on 
that date. Although the docket contains a minute 
entry reflecting the disposition, no signed judgment 
has been entered in the trial court record. Appellant 
filed a notice of appeal purportedly taken from the 
original judgment and the probation revocation on 
September 8, 2000. 
We lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of the 
appeal. Appellant did not file a notice of appeal 
within thirty days of entry of the October 29, 1999 
judgment, as required by Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. Contrary to the suggestion in 
appellant's docketing statement, probation revocation 
proceedings do not constitute a post-judgment motion 
to amend the judgment that extends the time for 
appeal from the original judgment under Rule 4(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. "Failure to 
file a timely notice of appeal deprives this court of 
jurisdiction over the appeal." Reisbeck v. HCA Health 
Ser\>s.. 2000 UT 48, 1 5, 2 P.3d 447. Although the 
notice of appeal was filed within thirty days of the 
hearing on probation revocation, no final appealable 
judgment has been entered containing the court's 
ruling. An unsigned minute entry is not a final 
appealable judgment. See, e.g., State v. Jimenez, 938 
P.2d 264, 264 (Utah 1997) (stating court has 
consistently dismissed appeals from unsigned minute 
entries); State v. Rawlinzs, 829 P.2d 150, 153 (Utah 
Ct.App.1992) (concluding an unsigned minute entry 
is not a final appealable judgment). Accordingly, we 
lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of the appeal. 
We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Our 
dismissal is without prejudice to a timely appeal filed 
after entry of a signed judgment on the probation 
revocation and reinstatement; however, our dismissal 
is with prejudice to any appeal from the October 29, 
1999 judgment. 
2001 WL 311194 (Utah App.), 2001 UT App 79 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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2005 WL 67585 (Utah App.), 2005 UT App 13 
(Cite as: 2005 WL 67585 (Utah App.)) 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT 
RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Shawn C. McGUIRE, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 20030418-CA. 
Jan. 13, 2005. 
Third District, Salt Lake Department; The Honorable 
Paul G. Maughan. 
Joan C. Watt and Nisa J. Sisneros, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Matthew D. Bates, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee. 
Before Judges DAVIS, JACKSON, and THORNE. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
PER CURIAM: 
*1 Shawn C. McGuire appeals the sentence entered 
by the trial court. McGuire also appeals an order 
denying a motion to reconsider the sentence. 
McGuire pleaded guilty to operation of a clandestine 
laboratory, a first degree felony under the 
circumstances of this case. See Utah Code Ann. § § 
58-37d-4(l)(a), -5 (2004 Supp.). On August 12, 
2002, the trial court sentenced McGuire to an 
indeterminate term of "not less than five years and 
which may be life in the Utah State Prison." Rather 
than file an appeal, on August 13, 2002, McGuire 
filed a "motion to reconsider sentence." The motion 
was denied on April 1, 2003, on the basis that there 
were no grounds upon which to "reconsider" the 
sentence, and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to 
reconsider a legally imposed sentence. McGuire 
subsequently filed this appeal. 
An appeal must be filed within thirty days from the 
entry of a final judgment or order. See Utah R.App. 
P. 4. In a criminal case, it is "the sentence itself 
which constitutes a final judgment from which the 
appellant has the right to appeal." State v. Bower, 
2002 UT 100, <f 4, 57 P.3d 1065. The "30- day 
period for filing a notice of appeal in a criminal case 
... is jurisdictional and cannot be enlarged by this 
[c]ourt." State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 37 (Utah 
1981). 
McGuire's notice of appeal was filed eight months 
after entry of the sentence by the trial court, long past 
the jurisdictional deadline. See Utah R.App. P. 4. 
However, McGuire argues that the time for filing an 
appeal was tolled in this case because McGuire filed 
a "motion to reconsider sentence" the day after the 
sentence was issued. fFNll 
FN1. McGuire argues that the "motion to 
reconsider" the sentence was actually a 
motion to "alter or amend the judgment" 
under rule 59(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, thereby tolling the time for 
appeal under rule 4 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. See Utah R.App. P. 
4(b). McGuire's attempt to categorize his 
"motion to reconsider" the sentence as a 
motion under rule 59 is unavailing because 
rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure specifically applies to sentences. 
See Utah R. Crim P. 22; Utah R. Civ. P. 
81(e) ("These rules of procedure shall also 
govern in any aspect of criminal proceedings 
where there is no other applicable statute or 
rule...."). The fact that a remedy under rule 
22(e) is extremely limited does not alter this 
outcome. 
Once a court imposes a valid sentence, it loses 
subject matter jurisdiction over the case. State v. 
Montova, 825 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah Ct.App.1991). 
However, rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure provides a mechanism by which a 
defendant may attack "an illegal sentence, or a 
sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." 
Utah R.Crim. P. 22(e). McGuire sought 
reconsideration of the sentence which was imposed 
after his guilty plea was entered in this case. Giving 
McGuire the benefit of the doubt, his motion to 
reconsider his sentence may be construed as a motion 
pursuant to rule 22(e). See Montova, 825 P.2d at 679. 
The district court's jurisdiction over the resentencing 
turns on whether the initial sentence was legal. Id. 
(citing State v. Babbell, 813 P.2d 86, 88 (Utah 
1991)). Under Montoya, this court must "determine 
© 2005 ThomsonAVest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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whether the initial sentence was valid. If it was valid, 
the trial court would have had no further subject 
matter jurisdiction to resentence [defendant]. 
Likewise, this court would have no jurisdiction to 
hear the appeal." Id. 
An illegal sentence under rule 22(e) must be 
"patently" or "manifestly" illegal. State v. 
Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9,f 15, 84 P.3d 854. "A 
'patently' or 'manifestly' illegal sentence generally 
occurs in one of two situations: (1) where the 
sentencing court has no jurisdiction, or (2) where the 
sentence is beyond the authorized statutory range." 
Id. McGuire's challenge to his sentence does not fall 
under either situation. Instead, McGuire challenges 
the decision of the trial court to deny probation and 
sentence him to prison, a decision that is "within the 
complete discretion of the trial court." State v. 
Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1049 (Utah Ct.App.1991). 
As in Thorkelson, the error alleged by McGuire 
involves an "ordinary or 'run-of-the-mill' error 
regularly reviewed on appeal under rule 4(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure." Thorkelson, 
2004 UT App 9 at f 15. TFN21 There is no showing 
that there was anything illegal about McGuire's 
sentence. 
FN2. Moreover, there is no showing that the 
trial court abused its discretion, let alone 
entered an "illegal sentence, or a sentence 
imposed in an illegal manner[.]" Utah 
R.Crim. P. 22(e). 
*2 Jurisdiction to resentence McGuire would require 
an illegality in the initial sentence. Because the initial 
sentence was legal, the district court lost subject 
matter jurisdiction over the sentence. See Montoya, 
825 P.2d at 680. Likewise, this court has no 
jurisdiction. See id. Lacking jurisdiction, we are 
required to dismiss the appeal. See Loffredo v. Holt, 
2001 UT97.T 1 K 37 P.3d 1070. 
Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
2005 WL 67585 (Utah App.), 2005 UT App 13 
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